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1  Introduction
Leaders from all countries have agreed to pursue the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to reach 
them by 2015 with a view to securing a world with less poverty, hunger and disease, with better-educated 
children, more gender equality, greater survival prospects for infants and mothers, and a healthier environ-
ment. With less than ten years to the time horizon, the challenges ahead are still staggering, though there are 
some signs of progress. In most developing countries, providing every child with primary school education 
appears to be within our grasp. In the developing world as a whole, income poverty has been on the decline 
and there have been important gains in assisted child delivery and coverage of vaccination programmes, 
which have contributed to declining child and maternal mortality.2 Progress has been uneven, however. Most 
of the gains in declining income poverty have been concentrated in much of Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa tends 
to lag far behind for most of the MDG indicators. Child mortality has been on the decline globally, but 
again with the least relative progress in Africa. Disparities in progress are also vast within countries and many 
of the poorest tend to be left behind, particularly in rural areas.
In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), poverty indicators tend to be lower on average than 
in most other regions of the developing world. By and large, the region also scores better on education and 
health performance indicators. At the same time, however, progress on many of these indicators has been 
slower than in many parts of East and South Asia. Yet it is safe to argue that countries in the LAC region 
have made important progress on average towards the MDGs (see figure 1). According to the United Na-
tions MDG report (United Nations, 2007), with unchanged trends in past achievement, the region should 
be able to attain the goals regarding net enrolment in primary education, gender equality in education, 
coverage of sanitation and drinking water, and possibly also that of child mortality. The speed of progress 
for achieving the goals for extreme poverty reduction and decreasing maternal mortality seems to be insuf-
ficient.3 The region as a whole would thus seem to be “off track” for those two goals and “on track” for the 
former set of goals, under the assumption that progress towards the goals will continue linearly according to 
the observed trend since 1990.
There can be no reason for complacency, however, since such linear projections should be taken 
with extreme caution. First, the path towards the goals need not follow a linear pattern. For instance, once 
child mortality rates have been lowered substantially, reducing them even further may require other, possibly 
1  Forthcoming as chapter 2 of a volume on Public Policies for Human Development. Feasible Financing Strategies for 
Achieving the MDGs in Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by Rob Vos, Enrique Ganuza, Hans Lofgren, Marco 
V. Sánchez and Carolina Díaz-Bonilla. The volume reflects outcomes of a joint project of UNDP, UN/DESA, UN/
ECLAC and the World Bank. We are grateful to Carolina Díaz-Bonilla, Enrique Ganuza, Hans Lofgren and Martín 
Cicowiez for helpful comments and suggestions to a first draft of this paper and to all country case authors for country-
specific inputs.
2  See United Nations (2007) for a recent update on progress towards the MDGs.
3  The present analysis addresses MDGs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7, reflecting the main focus of the 18 country studies carried out in 
the LAC region, whose results are discussed in this chapter. 2  DESA Working Paper No. 68
more costly, interventions. Second, a “business-as-usual” (BAU) scenario would need to be defined more 
appropriately as policies may have changed since 1990, and new policies in place may make it more—or 
even less—likely to achieve the goals. Using a model-based analysis of the economy-wide implications of a 
continuation of BAU policies, we find that, in the case of child mortality, for instance, LAC as a region does 
not appear to be on track, contrary to what a linear projection based on the data in figure 1 would suggest. 
In contrast, the region would be on track for meeting the poverty-reduction target as defined by the BAU 
scenario, owing mainly to the projected performance of the region’s larger economies, including Brazil and 
Mexico. Third, caution is also needed when looking more precisely at how the goals are defined. In the case 
of education, for instance, good progress is being made in terms of net enrolment, but the outlook is much 
less bright for primary school completion rates. Persistently high repetition and drop-out rates in primary 
education continue to pose a major challenge, and only four out of the 18 countries of the LAC region in 
the study (Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and Mexico) are expected to achieve the goal of 100 per cent primary 
school completion by 2015 with unchanged policies. Of course, the above picture only represents regional 
averages and disguises important differences between countries, as well as disparities in human development 
within the countries of the region.
The MDG agenda reflects awareness of such differences and of the challenges ahead, faced predomi-
nantly by the world’s poorest countries. In this context, many donor countries have made explicit commit-
ments to “scale up” aid over the medium term to meet the development goals. This focus on aid and on the 
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Africa and other least developed countries, many of which lack the necessary resources for financing the 
substantial increase in public spending that would be required to meet the goals.4 Therefore, much of the 
financing would be expected to come from increased aid flows. This situation in turn has spurred a debate 
about the trade-offs that would be associated with a “scaling-up” of aid by such magnitudes. The effectiveness 
of such a financing strategy has been questioned on several grounds (see, e.g., Heller, 2005; Bourguignon 
and Sundberg, 2006), such as a lack of good governance or sufficient absorptive and managerial capacity to 
efficiently utilize substantial aid flows for investment in MDG-related action; the potential cost of an appre-
ciating real exchange rate (RER) and the consequent undermining of export competitiveness (often labelled 
“Dutch disease”); and constraints on managing macroeconomic policy, both fiscal and monetary, owing to 
an increased reliance on multiple and volatile external sources of financing, as aid flows are typically provided 
by many donors subject to annual allocation processes.
Such issues are highly relevant for the poorest countries and require careful examination before 
embarking on strategies of massive foreign assistance. At the same time, this should not divert attention from 
what could be done in terms of domestic resource mobilization, which—next to increased and more effective 
aid—is another pillar of the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (United Nations, 2002, 
annex), but one that has been less at the forefront of the current debate on MDG financing strategies. Do-
mestic resource mobilization will be central to most middle-income developing countries, including those in 
LAC, which—except for Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua—are not eligible for increased aid flows 
and enhanced debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. While middle-in-
come countries are closer to achieving the MDGs, it is nonetheless true that about 40 per cent of the world’s 
moderate poor live in these countries.5 Moderate ($2 a day) and extreme poverty ($1 a day) also remain per-
vasive in LAC as they affect 40 and 10 per cent of the population of the region, respectively. In addition, the 
inequalities in levels of human development and the income distribution within these countries, as pointed 
out earlier, add to the tremendous challenges in this part of the developing world.
While the less poor countries may have greater access to (private) foreign borrowing, it is not 
entirely clear that Governments would wish to use much of these sources for public investments in social sec-
tors and in poverty-reduction programmes. On the other hand, greater reliance on domestic resources may 
imply stronger redistributive effects within the economy, which could impose political constraints on this 
kind of financing strategy. In addition, the issues faced by aid-recipient countries when shifting budgets to 
MDG-related programmes—including the associated relative price and resource shifts—may equally apply 
to countries relying on domestic financing strategies.
In the present paper, we will focus on a number of such trade-offs and financing constraints and 
provide a comparative analysis for 18 LAC countries, based on the case studies prepared by experts from 
each of those countries. In section 2, we will review the main issues at stake and the policy options for ad-
dressing related challenges. Section 3 outlines the contours of a modelling framework designed to analyse the 
trade-offs empirically—which is presented in detail in Lofgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2008). The comparative 
4  According to estimates of the UN Millennium Project, for instance, in order to achieve the MDGs the required 
additional public expenditures per year for a typical low-income country with an average per capita income of $300 
could amount to 10-20 per cent of its gross national product (GNP) (United Nations Millennium Project, 2005). 
If these figures are accurate, it would be hard to imagine that those countries would be in a position to finance the 
required additional spending through increased taxation or domestic borrowing.
5  Moderate poor are defined here as the population living on less than $2 a day. The middle-income country group refers 
to 86 developing countries with per-capita incomes of between $826 and $10,000 (2004 data). This group comprises 
just under half of the world’s population. For more details, see, World Bank (2006).4  DESA Working Paper No. 68
analysis of feasible financing strategies to achieve the MDGs in LAC is provided in section 4. The final sec-
tion summarizes the main findings and presents the policy lessons that can be learned from the comparative 
analysis.
2	 Constraints	to	financing	MDG-oriented	development	strategies
The Monterrey Consensus emphasizes that ensuring conditions to enable the mobilization of domestic and 
external resources is essential for development. This would entail, among other things, good governance that 
is responsive to the people’s needs and sound macroeconomic policies aimed at sustaining high growth rates, 
full employment, stability and poverty eradication. This should be supported by sustainable debt financing 
and debt relief and sufficient and effective provisioning of official development assistance (ODA).
Against this backdrop, financing for achieving the MDGs may face several constraints, particularly 
in the short run. Below we discuss some key macroeconomic policy areas and related trade-offs associated 
with different financing strategies for the achievement of the MDGs in LAC. Without attempting to be 
comprehensive, these include: limited policy space for prudent and countercyclical macroeconomic manage-
ment for growth and employment generation; competitiveness and RER constraints associated with both 
domestic and external financing strategies; the creation of fiscal space and maintenance of fiscal sustainabil-
ity; and, labour-market constraints.
Countercyclical macroeconomic policies
Economic growth is an essential ingredient for generating domestic resources to address development needs, 
including human development. But it is likely that, at any given growth rate, a higher degree of volatility 
limits the ability of Governments to mobilize a steady stream of resources for different purposes. For in-
stance, extended periods of booms and busts over recent decades did not allow Latin American economies 
enough time to recover or to draw on stable tax revenues.
More generally, macroeconomic stability strongly influences the long-term growth performance 
of an economy. In turn, the capacity to conduct countercyclical policies is a necessary condition to reduce 
volatility and increase a Government’s degree of freedom in times of possible crisis, and to enable it to have 
enough resources to protect the socially vulnerable and prevent further regress in poverty reduction. Against 
this backdrop, countercyclical policies may therefore be seen as a prerequisite for preventing the MDG-
related achievements of developing countries from regressing during times of macroeconomic instability and 
crises. History has shown, however, that the fiscal policy stance in both African and Latin American coun-
tries has been highly pro-cyclical on average since the 1960s, whereas in East Asia it has more typically been 
either neutral or countercyclical (United Nations, 2006b; Ocampo and Vos, 2008). It further shows that a 
pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy stance has been generally detrimental to long-term growth by exacerbat-
ing the short-run volatility in the economy and increasing perceived investment risks and uncertainty. The 
boom-bust economic cycles in Latin America during the 1990s closely followed the trend of capital flows. 
The upward and downward swings in the economy were typically exacerbated by pro-cyclical macroeconom-
ic policy responses (Ocampo, 2005; Ocampo and Vos, 2006).
Social expenditures also have been found to be pro-cyclical in many developing countries, some-
times even more so than total public expenditures, especially in Latin America (see, e.g., Martner and Aldu-
nate, 2006). This was very much a characteristic of fiscal policy during the 1990s, but more recently policy-Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  5
makers seem to have managed to protect social spending better. This is evidenced by a study of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2005) which showed that, 
during the period 1991-1997, the variation in overall social spending was almost three times higher than the 
variation in GDP, implying significant overshooting of social spending in both directions during cyclical up- 
and downswings. Between 1998 and 2003, this relationship weakened as the fluctuations in social spending 
were actually lower than those in GDP. According to the ECLAC study, most social spending sub-categories 
in the region became less volatile, except for health spending, which showed increased volatility and pro-
cyclicality from 1998-2003.
In summary, improvements in human development require adequate and sustained levels of public 
spending. For many developing country Governments, however, the space for conducting countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies is limited, as the available fiscal and foreign-exchange resources tend to be small 
relative to the size of the external shocks these countries face. Against this backdrop, mobilizing and com-
mitting fiscal resources for MDG achievement on a sustained basis for the medium-to-long run could in 
itself help attenuate the pro-cyclicality of fiscal spending and support more growth-oriented macroeconomic 
policies.
Competitiveness and real exchange-rate constraints
While sustained growth is important to ease the path towards MDG achievement, in most countries much 
greater priority will need to be given to public spending to meet infrastructure needs and improve the qual-
ity and coverage of basic social services. Public spending injections for these purposes may, however, put 
upward pressure on the RER. One way to define the RER is to see it as the price of “tradables” relative to 
“non-tradables”. Government services, including education, health, and infrastructure are typically seen as 
“non-tradable commodities” and many MDG-related activities are therefore considered non-tradables.6 Con-
sequently, a large shift in domestic spending towards MDG-related goods and services will push up demand 
for non-tradables. As a result, the price and cost of MDG-related services is likely to increase, since the Gov-
ernment will, among other things, try to hire more teachers and medical personnel, and may have to increase 
their wages if such workers are in short supply.7 Rising costs of non-tradable services will in principle shift 
the relative price against tradables, thus inducing an RER appreciation as defined above.
Financing MDG-related spending through aid flows or foreign borrowing will likely exacerbate the 
appreciation of the RER, as it will increase the supply of foreign exchange in the economy.8 In any case, the 
appreciation of the RER results in a loss of competitiveness of exports and import-competing firms. This 
may have important implications for long-term growth, as the export sector in many developing countries is 
an important contributor to aggregate growth and has potential dynamic spillover effects for the economy at 
large. RER appreciation may result in what is often labelled Dutch disease when it leads to a resource alloca-
tion away from export industries, resulting in an undesirable structural change away from dynamic produc-
tion activities—a shift that is typically difficult and time-consuming to reverse.
6  The production of some of these services, such as telecommunications, may nonetheless have a high import content.
7  While a shortage of this nature may put upward pressure on wages for skilled workers of this kind, arguably such a 
wage adjustment need not immediately eliminate the labour shortage, since the “generation” of new teachers, nurses 
and doctors will take several years of training. 
8  MDG-related spending includes all expenditures that are directly related to the achievement of the MDGs, such as 
spending on primary education, on health care aimed at reducing child and maternal mortality and combating major 
diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, and on the provisioning of basic sanitation infrastructure and 
services.6  DESA Working Paper No. 68
The actual impact on the RER and competitiveness will, however, depend on many factors, includ-
ing the import intensity of aggregate demand and of MDG-related expenditures in particular, and on the 
existing slack in production capacity (see e.g., Vos, Sánchez and Inoue, 2007). The impact on competitive-
ness will also depend on how greater achievement of the MDGs will affect the economy over time. Better 
infrastructure and a better-educated and healthier labour force may have important externalities in the form 
of productivity growth, attract foreign investors and thereby have a dynamic impact on economic growth. 
This presents an inter-temporal trade-off, as the RER appreciation would erode export competitiveness in the 
short run, while productivity gains and faster economic growth from increased MDG achievement would 
pay off only in the medium-to-long run. The question then is whether the negative short-run effects can be 
contained so as not to limit the resources available for long-term investments in human capital.
The empirical literature on Dutch disease shows a wide range of RER adjustments in response to 
strong increases in aid flows or private capital inflows, with the extent of the effects depending largely on the 
relative demand and supply effects across sectors, and thus on country-specific circumstances (Bevan, 2005; 
Heller, 2005; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006; Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006). Similarly, the degree to 
which increased taxation or domestic government borrowing changes the composition of domestic demand 
will depend on how private investors respond to higher public indebtedness and, possibly, higher domestic 
interest rates, and on which parts of the population have to carry the extra tax burden, and so on.
In summary, the risk of a loss of export competitiveness due to larger MDG expenditures is clear 
and present both in the case of external and of domestic financing. Nonetheless, one cannot say a priori that 
a poverty reduction strategy aimed at increased public expenditures for the MDGs would be harmful for 
growth or export capacity.
Creating fiscal space for MDG investment
Tax reform
Taxation should be central to any strategy for domestic resource mobilization aimed at enhancing public 
expenditures for social development. In most Latin American and Caribbean countries, there appears to be 
ample scope for increasing fiscal space through an expansion of the tax base and an increase in tax rates. The 
average level of tax revenues in LAC amounted to only 17 per cent of GDP around 2005 (see figure 2); less 
than half of the average for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Only 
Argentina (including provincial governments), Brazil, Jamaica and Uruguay had tax revenues above 23 per 
cent of GDP (Martner and Aldunate, 2006).
An important caveat with regard to increasing taxation as a means of financing MDG-related spend-
ing is the impact on domestic demand, as consumers will have less disposable income and investors may 
foresee lower net profits and therefore choose to reduce investments. Moreover, reduced disposable income 
and profits are likely to constrain private savings for investment financing. The domestic demand effect will 
also depend on who is to carry the additional tax burden. If indirect taxes have a greater effect on low-in-
come households, reforms pushing for increases in the value-added tax (VAT) and other indirect taxes could 
offset some of the welfare gains the poor would receive from enhanced MDG expenditures. Even if increased 
tax efforts are more distribution-neutral, they could affect the poor through lower economic growth in the 
short run as private domestic demand would fall. Increased public expenditures would compensate for this, 
but the long-run growth gains would depend on the efficiency of these expenditures.Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  7
Another important caveat relates to possible limits on how much additional tax revenue can be 
generated through tax reforms. If the experience of tax reforms of recent decades is indicative, one should 
not be overly optimistic in this regard. Latin American countries have been able to increase tax revenue (ex-
cluding social security contributions) since 1990 by about 2 percentage points of GDP on average (see e.g., 
Tanzi, 2000; Martner and Aldunate, 2006). While there is quite some variation across countries, the upper 
bound in the increases would be between 3 and 4 percentage points, though typically taking about a decade 
to achieve such increases. Studies for other developing countries also suggest that significant increases in tax 
revenue are not easy and are time-consuming to achieve (McKinley, 2007; Thirsk, 1997). In other words, 
while there seems to be clear scope for significant tax reform in Latin America, in practice the actual gains in 
mobilizing the necessary revenue for MDG-related spending may well be limited in the time span leading up 
to 2015. Another, potentially more promising, way to increase fiscal space for MDG-related public spending 
would therefore be an increase in efficiency in budget allocations.
More efficient budget allocation
There are at least three mechanisms for more efficient budget allocation through which one could seek to 
create more fiscal space for MDG spending. First, there may be scope for redefining priorities across budget 
items. This could entail readjustments across government sectors or ministries (e.g., from defence spending 
to education and health), or across subsectors within ministries or programmes (e.g., from higher education 





































0DOD\VLD6LQJDSRUHDQG7KDLODQG8  DESA Working Paper No. 68
Second, there may be scope for improving efficiency in the delivery of services. The quality and 
efficiency with which public services are provided will differ from country to country, and inefficiencies can 
emerge for a variety of reasons. In some cases, there may be blatant inefficiencies, however, such as absentee-
ism among teaching and medical personnel, which, if addressed, could generate important fiscal savings and 
social benefits. For instance, primary school teacher absence rates have been found to be as high as 27 per 
cent in Uganda, 25 per cent in India, 19 per cent in Indonesia and 14 per cent in Ecuador (see Rogers and 
others, 2004). In the case of Ecuador, for example, it has been estimated that reducing primary school teacher 
absenteeism by half could “save” about 2 per cent of the overall budget for the education sector. In the health 
care sector, a shortage of medical personnel may not be the only, or even the main, problem for improving 
the coverage of health services. For instance, doctors and nurses tend to be present mostly in Ecuador’s main 
urban centres, leaving the rest of the country uncovered (see, e.g., Vos and others, 2004; World Bank, 2004). 
Problems such as these and many others suggest that with a more efficient delivery of services the same 
amount of resources could yield much higher outcomes in education and health.
Third, even without such inefficiencies in delivery systems, MDG-related spending could be made 
more cost-effective by ensuring that within programmes and subsectors, resources are prioritized towards 
those “inputs” and activities which produce the greater outcome per dollar spent. For instance, a cost-effec-
tiveness analysis of the actions needed to meet the target of universal primary education in Ecuador suggest-
ed that with a more efficient allocation of resources it would be possible to achieve the education MDG at an 
annual extra cost of 0.2 per cent of GDP (Vos and Ponce, 2004). Specifically, a more cost-effective allocation 
of resources would entail focusing incremental budget resources on hiring better-trained teachers, expanding 
a conditional cash transfer programme to stimulate school attendance by the poor and improving the avail-
ability of rural schooling infrastructure.
Public borrowing and fiscal sustainability
In the short run, overall fiscal revenues and expenditure decisions determine an important part of the 
resources available for social development. However, in the medium and long runs, what happens “below 
the line” of fiscal accounts (i.e., the financing of deficits) will determine the sustainability of fiscal resources. 
Therefore, while public borrowing may be used as a source of financing for MDG-related public spending, 
this will have to be subject to medium- and long-term debt sustainability considerations.
While it is difficult to establish any standardized benchmark for sustainable public debt levels, assess-
ments by Governments in consultation with the IMF and the World Bank suggest that public debt distress 
in LAC decreased substantially during the 1990s, and even more so in recent years (see table 1). More pru-
dent fiscal policies (albeit sometimes at the expense of social spending and public infrastructure investment) 
and substantial debt relief in the HIPC countries have contributed to this trend, as well as to improved eco-
nomic performance in a number of cases. As seen in the assessments of debt sustainability reported in table 
1, most economies in the region have sailed away from acute debt distress. Nonetheless, it also holds for 
most countries that sustainability problems could easily return when faced with a growth slowdown, terms-
of-trade shocks or exchange-rate pressures. Hence, while for most countries there would at present appear to 
be scope for financing an MDG strategy through domestic or external borrowing, such measures would have 
to be cautiously assessed in the light of the country’s ability to maintain enhanced MDG spending alongside 
sustained economic growth.
Borrowing on domestic capital markets may be limited in some countries of the region as they 
have rather poorly developed markets for long-term government and corporate bonds denominated in Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  9
local currency. A deficient domestic bond market makes it more difficult to finance long-term public 
infrastructure investments and major private modernization projects (see United Nations, 2006b; Ocampo 
and Vos 2006, 2008). A poorly developed bond market in conjunction with a relatively low level of financial 
savings in the economy may further imply that government demand for domestic financing of its deficits 
would have rather strong upward effects on domestic interest rates and limit financing available for private 
investment. Under such circumstances, heavy reliance on domestic borrowing to finance the MDG strategy 
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also increase the cost of borrowing for private investors and hence domestically financed MDG investments 
could crowd out private investments and lower economic growth.
Labour-market constraints
For low-income countries, large-scale investments for the achievement of the MDGs could meet severe 
skilled-labour constraints in the short-to-medium run. Public expenditures centred on meeting the MDGs 
in the form of expanding basic social services in health and education would put intense pressure on a pool 
of teachers, doctors and other trained workers that is likely to be limited. Constraints on skilled labour 
could then lead to upward pressure on the skill premium for such workers, which in turn would increase the 
overall labour costs for the public sector and the cost of achieving the MDGs. Bourguignon and Sundberg 
(2006) suggest that, for reasons such as these, a sequenced approach to expanding MDG-related social ser-
vices may be needed in order to avoid disruptive pressures on labour costs owing to skill bottlenecks. Invest-
ing in specialized education and training for teachers and medical personnel should then precede or move in 
parallel with the expansion of the services themselves.
Such constraints may also exist in LAC, but they are likely to be less severe as most countries in 
the region rank as middle-income with higher initial educational levels. Trying to achieve the MDGs in the 
region may induce other labour-market constraints over time, however. As the MDG target for primary 
education is reached and more students are also likely to complete higher levels, the supply of skilled workers 
in the labour market will gradually increase. If the economy’s structure does not adjust commensurately to 
absorb the increased supply of better-educated workers, the skill premium will likely fall. While this, in turn, 
may lower the cost of achieving the MDGs, it is also likely to provide a disincentive to invest in education. 
Most empirical studies of the determinants of access to education indicate that expected private returns to 
education are not the sole determinant by far, but an important one nonetheless (Glewwe, 2002). Hence, 
insufficient creation of skilled jobs in the economy could jeopardize the achievement of the education MDG. 
While this could be counteracted by additional efforts by the Government to stimulate school attendance, 
the real problem would be how to improve the environment for stimulating a structural change in the 
economy towards technologies and activities that can absorb larger amounts of skilled labour.
How the indicated trade-offs present themselves will depend further on the functioning of the 
labour market, that is to say, on the degree of labour-market segmentation and the flexibility in real wage 
adjustment. Labour markets in developing countries are typically segmented owing to many factors that pre-
vent certain workers from finding a job in some sectors (Agénor, 1996). High barriers to entry into MDG-
related sectors may prevent the real wage from adjusting in a flexible way. For example, skill requirements 
may be very high in some MDG-related sectors, particularly in activities that are relatively advanced from a 
technological point of view (for example, hospital services). This may prevent certain types of workers who 
have a higher education but do not possess the required skills from having full access to jobs in MDG-related 
sectors. If skilled but not highly-skilled, workers may end up seeking employment in non-MDG-related 
sectors where, as a consequence, the real wage will probably fall. Should the real wage adjustment be insuf-
ficient to clear the labour market, unemployment and, most likely, underemployment will emerge, resulting 
in negative repercussions in terms of rising income inequality and poverty.
These changing patterns in the demand for labour could limit the degree to which aggregate income 
growth translates into poverty reduction. A strategy based on increased public spending for MDG-related 
services could alter the employment-growth pattern by increasing the skilled labour supply and, at least in Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  11
the short run, expanding employment in non-tradable services. What this means in terms of reducing pov-
erty will depend on country-specific conditions and will be discussed in more detail in section 4.
Such labour-market concerns and their implications for inequality and poverty are particularly press-
ing against the backdrop of recent labour-market developments in LAC. In most countries of the region, 
employment creation just about kept pace with GDP growth during the 1990s and early 2000s, indicating 
employment generation with little to no productivity growth. For half of the countries, employment growth 
has been less than labour-force growth, as reflected in the negative “net” employment growth rates in figure 
3. More atypically, Jamaica and Colombia witnessed the strongest net job creation rates at about 0.3 per cent 
per year between 1990 and 2005, even as their per capita GDP growth remained relatively modest. Among 
the faster-growing economies of the region since 1990, Cuba and the Dominican Republic managed to 
sustain a relatively labour-intensive growth pattern, whereas in Chile and Costa Rica productivity growth has 
implied insufficient employment generation for these countries’ growing labour forces. Overall, employment 
growth has been rather limited in all countries. In addition, especially in the countries with slower growth, 
much of the job creation has been in the informal sector (ECLAC, 2005).
3	 An	economy-wide	framework	to	assess	feasible	financing	 
	 strategies	for	achieving	the	MDGs
An economy-wide framework is required to examine the capacity and financing constraints to achieving 
the MDGs and the trade-offs discussed in the previous section. The existence of a wide range of interaction 
effects is the rationale for the use of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. As discussed above, 
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the economy. It will undoubtedly affect the demand for and supply of different types of goods and services, 
labour and capital, and foreign exchange, and the related adjustments may imply important trade-offs 
throughout the period for achieving the MDGs. The general equilibrium framework also takes into con-
sideration the possible synergies between the different MDGs. Such synergies may influence the required 
expansion of services (e.g., greater coverage of drinking water supply may reduce the need for health ser-
vice expansion) or the speed at which the various MDGs are achieved. Studies that take all of these general 
equilibrium and synergy effects into account may generate substantially different outcomes than studies that 
focus exclusively on sector analyses.
The outcomes will also depend to an important extent on the way in which the strategy is financed. 
Foreign financing may induce RER effects of the type discussed above, while financing through domestic 
taxes could reduce private consumption demand, among other things, and domestic borrowing could crowd 
out credit resources for private investment. Policymakers thus may face important trade-offs. No doubt 
increased public spending is essential for achieving the MDGs, but adjustments in the RER, real wages and 
other relative prices may increase the unit costs for achieving the MDGs along with the costs for other sec-
tors, or discourage exports, thereby widening the external deficit that needs to be financed, and so on. The 
productivity gains from greater MDG achievement will take some time to materialize and are thus unlikely 
to impact growth visibly in the short and medium terms. Therefore, it is critical that short-run trade-offs not 
offset potential economic and social gains in the longer run.
Dynamic CGE models for the simulation of policies aimed at human development goals have been 
developed before in studies during the 1970s and 1980s, especially in those providing analytical depth to the 
so-called basic needs approach to development (see, e.g., Kouwenaar, 1986; Hopkins and van der Hoeven, 
1982). At the time, such exercises were very time-consuming and costly because of data and computational 
limitations. Later, the shift away from concerns about employment, income distribution and poverty towards 
macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment in mainstream development policies also de-emphasized 
the need for such modelling efforts. More recently, work undertaken at the World Bank has revived the ap-
proach in the context of the ongoing debate about scaling up resources to achieve the MDGs. This newly 
developed framework has been labelled MAMS (Maquette for MDG Simulation) and was originally present-
ed in Lofgren (2004). A version with more limiting assumptions can be found in Bourguignon and others 
(2004). The framework was originally designed to deal in particular with low-income country contexts and 
the trade-offs associated with the scaling-up of aid inflows for MDG-related expenditures. It has been ex-
tended and applied in the context of the present study covering 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Lofgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2008) provide a detailed description of the version of MAMS applied to these 
country cases. Here, we only highlight some of the main features relevant for the subsequent discussion.
The MAMS framework has been built from a fairly standard CGE framework with dynamic-recur-
sive features but incorporates a special module which specifies the main determinants of MDG achievement 
and the direct impact of enhanced public expenditures on MDG-related infrastructure and services. MAMS 
considers specific targets for the MDGs of poverty reduction (MDG 1), achieving universal primary educa-
tion (MDG 2), reducing under-five and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5) and increasing access to safe 
water and basic sanitation (MDGs 7a and 7b). In the case of MDG 2, the demand for primary and other 
levels of schooling is a function of student behaviour (enrolment, repetition, graduation). Student behav-
iour, in turn, depends on the quality of education (identified by variables such as classroom availability and 
student-teacher ratios), income incentives (the expected wage premium from education), the under-five 
mortality rate (a proxy for the health status of the potential student population), household consumption Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  13
per capita (a proxy for the capacity to pay for education and for opportunity costs) and the level of public 
infrastructure (a proxy for the effective distance to school). Under-five and maternal mortality are consid-
ered to be determined by the availability of public and private health services, household consumption per 
capita, the level of public infrastructure (a proxy for the effective distance to health centres and hospitals), 
and the coverage of water and sanitation services. Access to water and sanitation, on the other hand, is 
modelled as a function of household consumption per capita, the provision of such services by public or 
private providers and the level of public infrastructure. Achievements in the reduction of income poverty 
are measured as the outcome of the overall general equilibrium effects from dynamic adjustments in pro-
duction, employment, wages and other relative prices, as well as changes in the quality of human capital 
through MDG-related expenditures.
The final outcome for income poverty can be estimated by looking at the outcomes for per capita 
household income and consumption for different household groups. However, CGE models can typically 
only specify a limited number of representative households, resulting in insufficient detail regarding changes 
in the distribution for making robust statements regarding the poverty outcomes. As a consequence, the 
CGE analysis needs to be supplemented by certain assumptions (such as fixed within-group distributions) 
or, as has been done for the empirical analysis reported here, by a method of microsimulations that takes the 
labour-market outcomes (unemployment, employment structure, relative remunerations and skill composi-
tion) from the CGE for different types of workers and applies them to a micro data set (such as a household 
survey) to obtain the required detail about income distribution for the poverty analysis. See Bourguignon, 
Robilliard and Robinson (2002) and Vos and others (2006) for a discussion and application of such methods 
in conjunction with CGE model analysis. The appendix gives further details of the method as applied to the 
18 country studies covered in the present study.
MAMS includes a relatively detailed specification of social services related to the MDGs, spell-
ing out different levels of education, different health sectors, sectors for drinking water and sanitation, and 
other public infrastructure. According to the model’s specifications, these services may be provided publicly 
or privately. Nonetheless, it is only new government investment and current expenditures that will lead to 
a policy-driven increase in the supply of MDG-related services and public infrastructure. For this to take 
place, the Government has to mobilize sufficient - domestic or foreign - resources to finance those new in-
vestments and expenditures.
The average skill level of the labour force will increase over time as more better-educated gradu-
ates leave the schooling system. This will in turn enhance productivity growth, with subsequent wage- and 
income-distribution effects. Output growth may be fostered as a result of those productivity gains, potential-
ly triggering economy-wide effects which in turn will affect MDG achievement.9 Achievements in drinking 
water and sanitation supply also help to improve health conditions, and improved health status may in turn 
impact positively on education outcomes along with other determinants.
9  A productivity parameter for each MDG-related sector can also allow the simulation of efficiency improvements in 
the delivery of such services. While the MAMS framework in principle allows the capture of such efficiency gains, 
the key problem is to obtain quantitative estimates for such externalities. This would require further country-level 
investigation. The MAMS-based country analyses discussed in section 4 do not consider such productivity gains 
and therefore, potentially, may underestimate the possible welfare gains from the MDG strategy. It could be argued, 
however, that because of the time lags involved between MDG investments today and enhanced productivity of 
workers tomorrow, most gains are likely to become effective after 2015, assuming that with better access to education, 
most children will remain in the schooling system for ten years or more.14  DESA Working Paper No. 68
Per capita household consumption responds positively to the Government’s increasing the sup-
ply of MDG-related services, and this may have further favourable implications for MDG achievement. 
However, since MAMS is an economy-wide model, per capita household consumption can also change as a 
result of relative price changes or could be affected by increased taxes to finance the additional MDG-related 
spending. Furthermore, all domestic income changes affect the economy’s capacity to generate savings. The 
macroeconomic viability of financing the new MDG-sector investment will depend on the macroeconomic 
constraints of the country, the initial debt burden, the source of financing, and the productivity of public 
investments towards the MDGs, among other factors.
4	 MDG	financing	strategies	for	LAC:	a	comparative	country	analysis
In this section, the outcomes of the MAMS-based analyses for 18 countries in the LAC region are scruti-
nized and compared. The following key questions guide the discussion:
Will the countries of the region be able to achieve the MDGs with essentially unchanged public  • 
spending and financing strategies?
How much additional resources would be needed, if any? •  10 Are there important cost-saving 
effects from the synergies among the various MDGs? Are there decreasing returns to MDG 
spending; that is to say, as one gets closer to achieving the MDGs, do the marginal costs of the 
policy interventions in education, health and sanitation increase?
Which financing strategy seems to be the most feasible in each context? Which macroeconomic  • 
trade-offs are the most important when comparing financing of the MDG strategy through 
increased aid flows, taxation, domestic borrowing or external borrowing?
Is there a trade-off between trying to achieve the MDGs for education, health and sanitation  • 
and the achievement of the MDG for income poverty?
The country studies referred to in the present paper have tried to answer these questions by run-
ning and analysing a number of alternative policy scenarios with the country-specific application of MAMS. 
These policy scenarios are compared to a baseline or BAU scenario, which aims to replicate observed perfor-
mance and policy stance in each country case. The common denominator in each of these policy scenarios 
is that—unlike in the baseline—MDG spending is scaled up in such a way that MDGs 2, 4, 5 and 7 are 
achieved by 2015. There are two kinds of policy scenarios: one simulates the achievement of each MDG 
target separately (or two simultaneously, as in the case of the health and the sanitation goals), whereas in the 
other, public spending is scaled up as much as required to ensure the simultaneous achievement of all MDG 
targets—excluding that of poverty reduction. All these MDG scenarios are performed under alternative 
financing rules, that is to say, the required increase in public spending is financed through, alternatively, in-
creased foreign grant aid, foreign borrowing, domestic borrowing or direct taxation. These scenarios allow us 
to assess synergy effects among the MDGs (by comparing the “individual” with the “simultaneous” MDG-
achievement scenarios) as well as the MDG-related spending requirements and macroeconomic trade-offs 
under different financing settings.
Is “business as usual” good enough for MDG achievement?
The BAU scenarios have been tailored to each country context, assuming in all cases what are considered to 
be realistic rates of economic growth and levels of public spending under a scenario of unchanged policies 
and absence of external shocks.
10  The country studies also answer a related question: what social sectors would require the most additional spending?Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  15
Table 2 gives an overview of the regional and country achievement of the MDGs by 2015 under the 
BAU scenarios. The regional aggregates are computed by using weighted averages following the same meth-16  DESA Working Paper No. 68
odology used in United Nations (2007). However, the present study uses a different definition of whether 
the countries and the region are on or off track in achieving the MDGs. In the absence of a better measure, 
the aforementioned publication (like many other studies) simply assumes the linear continuation of past 
trends in order to project whether any particular MDG would be achieved by 2015. In contrast, the BAU 
scenarios present better benchmarks for assessing whether countries are on or off track towards the MDGs, 
because the scenarios identify the currently expected growth scenario and assume continuation of current 
public spending policies; moreover, the MAMS model duly considers non-linearities in the effectiveness of 
social spending in achieving the targets.
Taking these factors into consideration, we find that, on average, the region appears to be on track 
to achieve MDG 1—to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the percentage of the population living on less than 
a dollar a day—under the BAU scenario. By the mid-point of the timeline from 1990 until 2015 (around 
2002-2003),11 the region had already achieved about 75 per cent of the target (see Statistical Annex, figure 
A.1). However, this is almost entirely on account of progress in poverty reduction in Brazil and Mexico, the 
region’s most populous countries. Eleven of the eighteen countries considered appear to be off track under 
the BAU scenario. Next to Brazil and Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica and Peru also appear to 
be on track, whereas the remaining countries would have to undertake additional efforts to reach the income 
poverty target. It is important to note, however, that extreme poverty, as measured using the poverty line of 
one dollar per person a day, is already very low in a number of the countries that are identified here as pre-
sumably being off track, such as Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba and Uruguay, whose extreme poverty incidence 
was below 3 per cent at around the mid-point of the trajectory to 2015. National poverty lines in LAC are 
generally more in the order of two dollars a day, and thus define a poverty challenge of much larger magni-
tude in the region. The present analysis concentrates on the international target for reasons of comparability; 
most country studies, however, assess the challenges for both moderate and extreme poverty measured with 
national poverty lines.12
This analysis suggests, contrary to other reports, that the region is off track in achieving the educa-
tion target. The region has made considerable progress in improving net enrolment rates and by this stan-
dard the region might be on track, as reported elsewhere (e.g., United Nations, 2007). However, all country 
studies considered here use 100 per cent primary school completion rates as the target for MDG 2.13 The 
approach illustrates that the main challenge for the region is to keep children in school and to improve the 
internal efficiency of the primary schooling system by reducing both repetition and drop-out rates. This is 
also important in order to ensure sufficient transition of students into secondary education, thereby helping 
to reduce existing deficiencies in the supply of skilled labour, which has been identified as a bottleneck for 
the ability of the region’s economies to adapt to the technological demands emanating from their increased 
exposure to global markets (see, e.g., Vos and others, 2006).
11  The mid-point, 2002-2003, also roughly corresponds to the base year for most of the country models (see table 3).
12  Fifteen country studies also report poverty outcomes for one or more nationally defined poverty line (those with 
more than one include a national poverty line for “extreme” poverty and one for “moderate” poverty). The three 
countries reporting international poverty lines only are Brazil and Ecuador (one dollar per day only) and Cuba (one 
dollar per day and two dollars per day). Results for the BAU scenario appear consistent for all poverty lines in terms 
of the direction and relative extent of poverty reduction and in terms of whether the target for MDG 1 is likely to be 
attained. The exceptions are Costa Rica and El Salvador (where MDG 1 would be achieved using national poverty lines 
but not when using the one dollar per day poverty line) and Colombia and Mexico (where MDG 1 would be achieved 
under the BAU scenario for the international poverty line but not for the national one). 
13  It should be noted that completion rates are defined in a strict sense in the country studies: that is to say, completion 
on time, without repetition, for the relevant country-specific age cohort for primary school.Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  17
Only four countries in the region (Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and Mexico) meet the target under 
the BAU scenario, and only one of these (Mexico) and two others (Peru and Nicaragua) have been able to 
achieve 50 per cent or more of the target for primary completion by mid-point (see table 2 and figure A.2).14 
A continuation of existing policies does not seem to ensure further progress in Nicaragua, and this may 
also prove problematic in Guatemala. In all other countries, economic conditions like those simulated in 
the BAU scenario would produce substantial improvements in primary school completion rates by the year 
2015, but not enough to meet the established target.
The region also appears to be off track for the health goals for reducing child mortality and improv-
ing maternal health (see table 2). Child mortality rates have declined substantially throughout the region 
over the past decades. By mid-point, 14 out of the 18 countries had achieved 50 per cent or more of the 
targeted reduction in child mortality (see figure A.3). Observed trends in Jamaica, Uruguay, Costa Rica and 
Colombia suggest less progress in these countries. Projected trends in health spending and progress on other 
determinants of reductions in child mortality (such as improved education and higher real consumption 
levels) are expected to produce further important reductions in child mortality in most countries, though to 
a lesser extent in Honduras, Peru, Guatemala and El Salvador. Only Chile, and most likely Cuba also (the 
country with the lowest child mortality rate in the region), would be able to meet the target under the condi-
tions of the BAU scenario. All other countries would fall short of the target. It should be noted, however, 
that child mortality rates are already quite low in some of these countries (such as in Argentina, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Cuba and Uruguay) and that further reductions will have relatively high marginal costs.
Progress in terms of maternal mortality has been much less and, on average, the countries of the 
region had achieved just one third of the required progress towards the target by mid-point (see table 2 and 
figure A.4).15 Only two countries (Cuba and Chile) would achieve the goal on time under the BAU scenario.
A more optimistic picture emerges concerning the achievement of goals 7a and 7b, the provision 
of access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. The region as a whole is on track, and many coun-
tries already achieved the international goals around mid-point (see table 2 and figures A.5 and A.6). More 
precisely, 10 out of the 18 countries had already achieved more than 50 per cent of MDG 7a by around 
the mid-point. Six of these countries (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico and Uruguay) have already 
achieved the internationally defined target for MDG 7a and have set more ambitious national targets, which 
they would also achieve on time under the BAU scenario. Several countries, however, would remain far-
removed from achieving the international goal under the BAU scenario, including Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Peru and Paraguay.
Six countries (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay) had already 
achieved the international goal of halving the percentage of the population without sustainable access to basic 
sanitation by mid-point. These countries and some others that have not yet achieved the international goal 
(Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru) have set more ambitious national goals. Under the BAU scenario, 
14  In the country studies of Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, the authors argue that the target for MDG 2 will not be 
achieved, as the primary completion rates in 2015 level off at 98.9%, 99.1% and 92.2%, respectively. In the present 
paper, however, MDG 2 is considered to be achievable in practical terms in view of the relatively small margin by 
which these figures fall short of 100% and the difficulty in further reducing this margin.
15  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay are not included because MDG 5 is not analysed in the respective 
country studies. It should be noted, however, that data on maternal mortality generally suffer from major deficiencies. 
The country studies which did include maternal mortality in the analysis made an effort to ensure that the best possible 
data were used.18  DESA Working Paper No. 68
the region on average is on track towards the internationally defined target for MDG 7b, but would be off 
track when considering the more ambitious goals that some countries have established. One country (Costa 
Rica) would achieve its more ambitious national goal well in advance under the BAU scenario and six others 
(Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay) are on track. Mexico is on track to 
achieve the less ambitious international goal. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and Peru are among the countries that require substantial additional efforts to meet this goal.
In summary, the region as a whole seems on track (as more appropriately defined) for the targets 
for income poverty reduction (MDG 1) and off track for the targets for reducing child and maternal mor-
tality (MDGs 4 and 5). While by and large on track for meeting universal access to primary education as 
measured by net enrolment rates, the region is off track when it comes to ensuring school completion on 
time by all that enrol in primary education. The (international) targets for water and basic sanitation appear 
to be achievable under existing policies in 9 of the 18 countries. Since these include Brazil and Mexico, the 
regional average suggests adequate progress towards these goals in the LAC region, although increased efforts 
will be needed in half of the countries.
How much will it cost to achieve the MDGs?
As discussed above, the MDG scenarios analysed with MAMS delineate a path towards the full achievement 
of the targets for goals 2, 4, 5 and 7a and 7b, as defined above (see notes to table 2). In these scenarios, the 
MAMS model allows an estimation of the required additional public spending based on what were found to 
be core determinants of primary school completion rates, child and maternal mortality and access to drink-
ing water supply and basic sanitation. Apart from overall general equilibrium effects, the model considers 
three important factors which may influence these cost estimates considerably.
First, the complementarities or synergies among the various development goals; for instance, extra 
public spending on primary schooling leading to better educational outcomes may positively influence 
health behaviour and thus simultaneously help reduce child mortality. Such synergy effects can be captured 
by comparing the cost estimates for the scenarios under which the Government aims to achieve each of the 
MDGs separately with those for meeting them simultaneously.
Second, the source of financing for the additional public spending could influence the required cost 
of achieving the MDGs. For instance, when additional MDG-related public spending is financed through 
direct taxes, disposable household incomes may be affected and hence also private spending on education, 
health and sanitation, which in turn may require the Government to step in with additional efforts in order 
to achieve the MDGs. In the event that increased domestic borrowing by the Government crowds out pri-
vate investment, future GDP growth would be affected, thus impacting the cost estimate of MDG-related 
spending relative to GDP.
Third, the MAMS model assumes that there are increasing marginal costs for achieving each of the 
development goals. This is captured through (logistic) functions calibrated with parameters that in most 
cases were estimated on the basis of country-specific sector analyses. It is thus possible that the required 
additional public spending for countries that are already close to achieving the goals may still be substantial 
because of the higher marginal costs.
Below, we analyse the required additional MDG spending for the 18 LAC countries, where “addi-
tional MDG-related public spending” is defined as the difference between the estimate for total spending on 
MDG-related services under the MDG scenarios and that under the BAU scenario for each country model. Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  19
In the cases of Cuba and Chile, in particular, the MDGs can be achieved at no additional cost. The model 
analysis for these two countries suggests that MDGs 2, 4, 5 and 7 will be achieved under the BAU scenario 
(see table 2). For the other 16 countries, additional MDG-related public spending ranges from 0.9 per cent 
of GDP on average per year between the base year and 2015 for Peru, to 6.1 per cent of GDP per year for 
Guatemala (see table 3).
Synergies among MDGs yield cost savings
Progress on all MDGs creates cost-saving synergies. Such synergies are observed for all countries needing to 
increase MDG-related spending in order to reach the goals, except for Honduras and Uruguay. The synergy 
effect can amount to more than 1 per cent of GDP per annum, as in the case of Guatemala (see table 3). 
Significant cost savings of more than 0.5 percentage points of GDP per annum originating from positive in-
teraction effects between education, health and sanitation are also estimated for Nicaragua, Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Brazil and Colombia, although not for all financing scenarios discussed below. In any case, the existence 
of such synergy effects is a strong argument—including from the point of view of the efficiency of public 
spending—for a simultaneous, rather than a phased, achievement of the MDGs.
The financing strategy matters for MDG cost estimates
In seven countries (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Paraguay and Peru), the additional 
costs are 2 per cent of GDP per annum or less regardless of the financing scenario (see table 3). The cost 
would be of a similar magnitude for Bolivia, if that country were able to finance the MDG strategy fully 
with foreign financing (grants or borrowing), and for Brazil, if financed through external borrowing. The 
MDG scenario is more costly for these two countries when the additional spending is financed through 
domestic resource mobilization. Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua require the largest extra public spend-
ing effort (more than 3.5 per cent of GDP per year), regardless of the financing scenario. The Dominican 
Republic and Mexico also fall into this category, but only if the MDG strategy is financed through domestic 
resource mobilization; for these countries, external financing would be a cheaper option.
These results illustrate that the financing strategy has an important bearing on the cost estimates. 
The required additional MDG-related public spending is generally lower when financed from abroad, since 
both sources of domestic finance come at a price. As indicated above, domestic borrowing may crowd out 
private investment. Not only does this have implications for GDP growth, it also hurts the private provision-
ing of MDG-related services, and the Government would have to spend more to achieve the MDGs. On 
the other hand, an increase in income taxes may affect disposable household income, which could also affect 
private investment through lower private savings; more importantly, it causes a “consumption-compression 
effect” which results in a decrease of private demand for MDG-related services compared to the other financ-
ing scenarios. Again, in order to achieve the MDGs, the Government needs to compensate the reduction in 
private demand for MDG-related services by further increasing MDG-related public spending.
For a large number of the country cases analysed, the estimated cost of the required additional 
MDG-related public spending is lower under the tax financing scenario than under that of domestic borrow-
ing (see table 3). In three countries, however (Colombia, Ecuador and Nicaragua), the “consumption-com-
pression” effect of higher taxation is relatively strong, making taxation the more expensive financing strategy. 
Raising income taxes is unambiguously more costly than mobilizing resources from abroad but, as discussed 
below, this does not necessarily mean that domestic resource mobilization could not be the better financ-
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which also need to be considered.
MDG costs rise as countries get closer to the target
The average additional annual MDG-related public spending during the last five years (2010-2015) is larger 
than during the entire simulation period (that is to say, from the base year to 2015) in 13 countries out of 16 
(see table 3). This difference—or “incremental MDG-related public spending”—is the result of a rise in the 
marginal public spending that is necessary to achieve the MDGs towards the end of the period, as the goals 
are already closer to being achieved.
The “incremental MDG-related public spending” tends to be higher when resources are mobilized 
domestically because the crowding-out and consumption-compression effects magnify over time. Incremen-
tal spending is substantial in some countries. It is estimated at about or above 1 per cent of GDP per year in 
eight countries (Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico and 
Nicaragua), regardless of the MDG financing strategy, and even slightly above 3 per cent of GDP per annum 
in two countries (Guatemala and Mexico) in the case of domestically mobilized resources. This evidence 
should be seen as a reminder to Governments that sustained higher public spending efforts will still be re-
quired when the MDGs are (close to being) achieved.
“Feasible” financing scenarios
In order to establish the “optimal” financing strategy for the increased MDG-related public spending, a 
number of factors must be considered. One possible criterion for assessing the desirability of certain financ-
ing options is the effect that these will have on the estimated costs of delivering MDG services, as discussed 
above. There are other important considerations, however. As discussed in section 2, borrowing strategies 
will need to take into account the implications for public debt sustainability over time. Foreign aid financ-
ing may not be a feasible option for most of the middle-income countries of the region, and those that do 
have access to this financing source will need to consider consistency of policy conditionality with the MDG 
strategy and the desirability of prolonged aid dependency. Each of the financing strategies will need to take 
into account possible macroeconomic trade-offs, such as RER appreciation and possible erosion of export 
competitiveness, which are likely to be stronger in the case of external borrowing or foreign aid financing. 
Meanwhile, domestic financing strategies risk the crowding-out of private consumption and investment.
There are no absolute benchmarks for rigorously establishing the feasibility or optimality of the 
various financing strategies. For instance, the critical level of public indebtedness will vary from one country 
context to another. Furthermore, the degree to which Governments will be able to raise tax revenues to the 
required levels will depend on the initial levels of tax burden and, no less importantly, on political economy 
considerations. Hence, in the analysis below, the choice of financing strategy recommended by the country 
studies is used as the initial reference, and is then reassessed in the light of the macroeconomic trade-offs and 
political economy considerations.
One caveat here is that the analysis of the financing scenarios only allows the comparison of situa-
tions in which the additional MDG-related spending is fully financed through one of the four options con-
sidered. While this has the advantage of helping to understand the merits of one financing option vis-à-vis 
another, it has the disadvantage of not giving explicit consideration to possible “mixed” financing strategies 
which might avoid or mitigate certain undesirable trade-offs. The question of the feasibility of mixed strate-
gies will be addressed below.22  DESA Working Paper No. 68
Table 4 summarizes some key results of the country studies regarding the assessment of financing 
strategies. Upon initial inspection, three main findings stand out. First, most country studies recommend 
financing the MDG strategy through increased taxation. This is the case for all but five countries: Bolivia and 
Honduras recommend aid financing, in line with the poverty-reduction strategy framework they adopted in 
the context of the HIPC Initiative. Despite a high public debt overhang, the authors of the Jamaican study 
see external borrowing as the more desirable financing strategy, since the alternative of tax financing is con-
sidered to be less feasible in the light of an already high tax burden and recent increases in rates. The authors 
of the studies for Guatemala and Uruguay do not rank any single financing option superior to another.
Second, while tax financing appears the most favoured option, external borrowing or aid financ-
ing is in all cases cheaper in terms of the required additional public spending on MDG-related services. The 
country studies, nonetheless, typically prefer tax financing, as further external borrowing is considered to lift 
public debt beyond a critical level of sustainability and/or entails other important trade-offs, such as signifi-
cant declines in export competitiveness.
Third, no country study recommends a strategy exclusively based on domestic government borrow-
ing. Not only would domestic borrowing generally be more costly in terms of the required extra spending, as 
indicated above, but in many cases it would also raise the total public debt burden to unsustainable levels. In 
the cases of Colombia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, where this financing strategy would be (slightly) less costly 
than increasing taxes (see table 3), the weakly developed domestic bond market and the possible consequenc-
es for levels of total public indebtedness (should the Government indeed be able to borrow domestically) 
would render such a strategy untenable.
Given these recommendations, the question remains: How “feasible” are those “recommended” 
financing strategies and what would be the alternatives?
The scope for tax financing
As discussed in section 2, most LAC countries have comparatively low tax burdens, suggesting ample space to 
increase some of that burden in favour of achieving the MDGs. As shown in table 4, the required increase in 
tax revenues may differ from the estimated increase in MDG spending because of general equilibrium effects; 
in other words, the increased public spending may affect output and employment differently across sectors and 
this may have a bearing on overall tax revenue.16 In a number of cases (6 out of 13) reported in table 4—includ-
ing Guatemala and Uruguay for which the respective country studies did not recommend any preferred financ-
ing strategy—tax revenue would have to increase by about 0.4 per cent of GDP more than the estimated MDG 
costs.17 This is due to a resource shift towards activities that on average tend to be taxed less (such as services 
which are produced in large parts by the Government itself or by the informal sector). In Brazil, the Domini-
can Republic and Nicaragua, the tax burden needs to rise by less because of opposite resource shifts, whereas in 
Paraguay the tax burden would need to rise in proportion to the estimated additional MDG-related spending.
16  If tax revenue ultimately falls short of financing all—and not only MDG-related—public spending, then direct taxes 
will tend to increase beyond what is strictly required to finance new MDG-related spending in order to keep a fiscal 
deficit from emerging. This in turn leads to an added tax burden to finance the additional MDG-related spending.
17  In the case of Guatemala, this difference is found to be substantially larger than anywhere else. According to the 
country case study, an increase in income taxes to finance MDG achievement would greatly reduce household incomes. 
Consequently, the resulting “compression effect” on private spending on MDG-related services is also strong, lowering 
aggregate demand and the tax base of the economy. This then requires rather significant increases in the direct tax rate 
to be able to finance the large additional public spending needed to meet the MDGs, including the spending needed to 
offset the drop in private spending. The magnitude of this outcome for Guatemala is, of course, driven by the specific 
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Having said this, among those countries for which the tax-financing strategy is recommended in the 
respective country studies, the required additional tax burden would range between 1.3 per cent of GDP in 
Peru to 6.0 per cent in the case of Mexico. For seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru), the required increase in tax revenue would be between 1.0 and 2.5 per cent 
of GDP. This seems to be a feasible range of effective tax revenue increase, which countries conducting tax 
reforms have been able to achieve on average over more or less a decade, as discussed in section 2. Beyond 
this, admittedly arbitrary, upper bound of the indicated range, tax reform should be expected to be much 
more demanding for a variety of reasons, not least owing to political economy concerns. Such is the case for 
the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Guatemala. This is not to suggest 
that these countries should not pursue tax reform for the MDG financing strategy, but they will have to give 
cautious consideration to how far out they can effectively push the tax revenue curve. For all countries, it is 
probably the case that increasing tax revenue, even by a few percentage points of GDP, may not be some-
thing that can be achieved overnight, but may take years to effectuate. In the meantime, this would require 
some kind of mixed financing strategy as discussed below.
More aid?
The possibility of financing the MDG strategy through increased grant aid is considered in the modelling 
of a few of the country cases only, since most countries in the region lack significant access to this type of 
funding. Where this does apply (i.e., in the cases of Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru), 
aid financing is least costly in terms of required additional public spending (see table 4).18 Only Bolivia, 
Honduras and Nicaragua are eligible for debt relief, however, and have to varying degrees already received 
significant amounts of development assistance under the HIPC initiative. In order to finance the required 
additional public MDG-related spending, aid flows to these countries would have to increase by 3.1, 7.7 and 
3.5 percentage points of GDP on average per year, respectively. In the case of Honduras, current levels of 
aid inflows are about 8 per cent of GDP and, hence, would almost need to double. Such an increase may be 
difficult to negotiate with donors. Dutch disease effects explain why the required aid inflows for this country 
(16.3 per cent of GDP per annum) are so much higher than the required additional public spending (4.3 per 
cent of GDP per annum): the average rate of RER appreciation under the aid-financing scenario would be 
about 7.5 per cent compared to the BAU scenario, causing the exports-to-GDP ratio to drop by more than 5 
percentage points and the trade deficit to widen (see figure 4).
This effect is also present in Bolivia, but to a much lesser extent, and appears to be absent in Nicara-
gua. In the case of Nicaragua, however, aid dependence is already quite high (ODA amounted to more than 
18 per cent of GDP on average during 2000-2005), which is why the country authors recommend a tax 
financing strategy rather than proposing a further increase in aid dependence. However, given the rather sub-
stantial required increase in the tax burden (4.4 per cent of GDP) that is estimated for Nicaragua, it may be 
more realistic to pursue a combination of a tax increase and, at least in the short run, additional foreign aid. 
On the other hand, aid flows to Bolivia currently average about 8 per cent of GDP per year and the required 
increase of 3.1 per cent to achieve the MDGs would be substantial, though perhaps negotiable, and could be 
replaced by higher tax revenues over time.
18  It should be noted, however, that at present Peru and El Salvador receive rather small amounts of official development 
assistance (ODA). In 2005, net ODA receipts by these two countries amounted to 0.5 and 1.2 per cent of gross 
national income, respectively. In the other countries, especially, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Honduras, ODA receipts, 
historically and in recent years, have been much more substantial, in part owing to their HIPC status.Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  25
More public borrowing?
While foreign borrowing is typically least costly in terms of required additional spending, it also seems to en-
tail substantial trade-offs in the form of RER appreciation and a loss in export revenue. This explains much 
of the difference between columns (5) and (6) in table 4. Such trade-offs are much less substantial under the 
tax financing scenarios, for example (see figure 4). In addition, in all country cases (with the exception of 
Peru), total public debt would rise to 65 per cent of GDP or (much) more under both the foreign borrowing 
(table 4) and the domestic borrowing scenarios. This would put public indebtedness beyond critical levels of 
sustainability in all countries (except perhaps Peru) based on the information in table 1 above.19 The country 
studies confirm this, concluding that financing the MDG strategy fully through either internal or external 
government borrowing is not feasible, with the possible exception of Jamaica for the reasons indicated above.
“Feasible” financing strategies
The policy scenario analysis of the MAMS framework involved assessing alternative single financing options 
for the MDG strategies. Based on our further assessment of these options, however, it appears that only in a 
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few countries would a “one-legged” financing strategy seem feasible, as summarized in table 5. For Bolivia, 
aid financing would seem a feasible option, provided that donors are willing to support it. Of course, it 
would remain advisable for the Bolivian Government to consider enhancing domestic resource mobilization 
also, especially through tax reform, in order to reduce aid dependency over time.
Tax financing would seem a feasible strategy for Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Peru, and possibly also the Dominican Republic—if combined with foreign borrowing, as will be explained 
below—given the degree of tax revenue increase that would be required as well as the milder macroeconomic 
trade-offs generated by tax increases compared to alternative financing scenarios. Peru, the Dominican Re-
public and Costa Rica have manageable baseline levels of public indebtedness and hence would have space to 
distribute the financing burden by combining tax revenue increases and foreign borrowing.
In the other country cases, a mixed financing strategy would also seem the most realistic. For Hon-
duras and Nicaragua, this could consist of a combination of initiating tax reform and seeking more foreign 
aid. As already discussed, in the case of Nicaragua, tax financing (as recommended in the country study) 
would require a rather substantial increase in government revenue (4.4 per cent per annum), more than any 
tax reform is likely to accomplish in the short-to-medium run. For Honduras, foreign aid financing is recom-
mended in the country study, but considering the presumably strong erosion of export earnings this would 
generate, a “two-legged” strategy of tax-cum-aid financing might be better suited to mitigating the trade-offs.
All other country cases would probably need to seek a combination of tax reform, very limited public 
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spending. In those cases (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico and Uruguay), either the re-
quired tax increase would be too high in relation to what a well-executed tax reform might be able to achieve, 
or levels of public indebtedness are already close to or above critical points of sustainability—or both.
A mixed financing strategy should possibly be recommended for all 18 countries in order to mini-
mize detrimental macroeconomic trade-offs. Even so, our comparative analysis makes it clear that in most 
countries the emphasis should be on increasing tax revenue. For many countries, however, this will most 
likely not be sufficient, and they would need to supplement this strategy with some (limited) degree of for-
eign financing and/or improved efficiency in MDG-related expenditures.
Poverty reduction (MDG 1), inequality and growth
As discussed above, the MAMS scenario analysis treats the results for MDG 1 as endogenous to economy-
wide adjustments as manifested in labour-market shifts that are then translated into expected outcomes 
for poverty and inequality at the household level, using the microsimulation methodology described in the 
appendix. Using this approach, we find that the income poverty reduction target is expected to be met under 
the BAU scenario in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico and Peru (see table 2 and figure 
A.1). The inclusion of Mexico and Brazil sets the region at large on track for the goal. BAU does lead to pov-
erty reduction for the other countries,20 but not by enough of a margin to meet the target.
The question is, then, whether a strategy of increased public spending for the achievement of the 
MDGs in education, child and maternal health, and water and sanitation will also help reduce income pov-
erty beyond what is achieved under the BAU scenario. Results for the poverty incidence of those living on 
less than one dollar a day show that in 10 countries, the “feasible” MDG strategy—as defined in table 5 for 
each country—would lead to further poverty reduction compared to the BAU scenario, but only Honduras 
is expected to join the countries that are anticipated to meet the target for MDG 1 by 2015 (see tables 6 and 
A.1). Substantial reductions in extreme poverty by 2015 are also expected in Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua 
and Paraguay, but this would largely also be achieved under the BAU scenario, and whatever further poverty 
reduction may be expected under the MDG scenario would not be sufficient to meet the target for MDG 1 
in these countries. For most countries, the degree of poverty reduction under the MDG scenario is either the 
same as or greater than under BAU. Only in the cases of Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay would there actually be 
slight losses in poverty reduction, mostly explained by relatively small changes in income distributions trig-
gered by the MDG strategy.
The results of the microsimulations suggest that most of the progress towards MDG 1 is explained 
by average income and employment growth under both the BAU and MDG scenarios. In fact, employment 
and GDP growth tend to move together. Figure 5 shows that this pattern is more or less the same under the 
BAU and the MDG scenarios (using the “feasible” financing scenario for the latter). Only in the cases of 
Guatemala and Honduras would the implied employment-output elasticity fall significantly under the MDG 
scenario (by 47 and 23 per cent, respectively), apparently because of the lower labour intensity of MDG-
related services sectors compared to the average for tradable sectors. In the other country cases, the implied 
employment-output elasticity is more or less the same under both scenarios and ranges from a low of 0.2 for 
Uruguay to a high of 0.9 for Nicaragua, with a regional average of about 0.5.
20  The only exception is El Salvador, where observed extreme poverty in 2005 is lower compared with that in the BAU 
scenario in 2015. This setback is depicted in figure A.1 and, according to the study for this country, is due to the fact 
that labour income distribution deteriorates for informal and underemployed workers and for workers that are paid 
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Countries with above-average employment-output elasticities (Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua and Paraguay) are also the ones which would see greater absolute changes in poverty reduc-
tion (see figure 6). Other countries with employment elasticities above the regional average, like Argentina, 
Mexico and the Dominican Republic, have low base-year values for income poverty and show only limited 
further poverty reduction.
Initial poverty levels and income distribution patterns would also seem relevant in explaining why 
countries like Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Peru show relatively little abso-
lute poverty reduction while sustaining relatively high growth rates under both the BAU and MDG sce-
narios. On the other hand, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay show more visible 
absolute poverty reduction (5 percentage points or more) at moderate per capita GDP growth rates (between 
0.7 and 2.5 per cent per annum). In those cases where the MDG scenario yields greater poverty reduction 
than the BAU scenario, the former also yields a higher growth rate than the latter, and vice versa.
The predominance of employment and average income effects in explaining changes in poverty sug-
gests that income redistribution effects under both the BAU and the MDG scenarios tend to be weak. This 
is confirmed by the results for the changes in the Gini coefficient of per capita household income (see table 
6). During the simulation period to 2015, little income redistribution is generally achieved under either the 
BAU or the MDG scenario. As a general finding, this might be surprising, as the MDG scenario, in particu-
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ing the poor who currently tend to have a lower education level. The MDG strategy, as discussed in section 
2, should be expected to raise both the demand for and supply of skilled workers. One should, however, also 
expect a timing disparity: the demand for skilled workers in MDG-related services will go up first, whereas 
the increase in the supply of skilled workers would materialize with a lag, given the time it will take before 
the better-educated school graduates enter the labour market—most likely beyond the time horizon of the 
present analysis. However, in the case of the LAC countries, much progress was already made in improv-
ing access to education during the 1990s, and hence skilled labour-supply growth may already be relatively 
strong without the MDG strategy. Shifts in the skilled-unskilled composition of labour demand will depend 
further on changes in sectoral labour demand induced by general equilibrium effects of the MDG strategy.
The results shown in table 6 indicate that in nearly all countries the demand for unskilled labour 
falls relative to that for skilled labour, and in most cases this shift is more predominant under the MDG 
scenario, confirming the hypothesis outlined above.21 In the presence of a time lag, this shift towards greater 
employment opportunities for skilled workers would likely push up income inequality. However, as table 6 
also indicates, in most cases this inequality-increasing employment shift tends to be offset (more than pro-
portionately in most cases) by increasing relative labour incomes for unskilled workers. This reflects the fact 
that, indeed, in most countries, the growth of the supply of skilled workers is already outpacing that of un-
skilled workers, while production technologies in most sectors of the LAC economies remain fairly intensive 
21  Only in El Salvador and Guatemala under both the BAU and the MDG scenarios does growth in the demand for 
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in the use of unskilled labour. In other words, their economies are not yet able to absorb fully the growing 
numbers of skilled workers; this in turn is putting downward pressure on the wage premiums for education 
and, on balance, reduces the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in most country cases.
These opposing shifts in the skill composition of employment and in the unskilled-skilled wage 
ratios explain the minimal effects on income distribution. Both labour and per capita household income 
inequality tend to fall in most country cases, but by small margins only. The only real exception is Brazil, 
which shows stronger income redistribution effects; these are, however, expected to occur under both the 
BAU and MDG scenarios where income poverty falls remarkably (see table 6). Income distribution in Brazil 
appears to be particularly sensitive to changes in the mean wage and in the wage of a large population of un-
skilled workers relative to skilled workers. Only in a few countries do very small changes in inequality weigh 
substantially enough to offset partially the income-poverty reduction of the BAU scenario. As mentioned 
above, in Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, poverty reduction in the MDG scenario is lower relative to that in 
the BAU scenario. Income distribution in these countries would actually be slightly more unequal under the 
MDG scenario than under the BAU scenario.
5  Conclusions and policy recommendations
The results from the country studies referred to in the present paper demonstrate that achieving the MDGs 
in LAC is within reach for most countries, but BAU alone is inadequate; even if it comes at a modest cost, 
the financing of an MDG strategy will require careful macroeconomic management. The main findings and 
policy conclusions of the present analysis can be grouped under four headings.
Business as usual is (for the most part) not good enough
The region is on track for MDGs 1 and 7 (poverty reduction and access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation), but appears to be off track for the education (MDG 2) and health goals (MDGs 4 and 5). “On 
track” and “off track” have been defined more appropriately here than elsewhere, where progress towards 
the goals is usually projected linearly based on the trend observed since 1990. The present analysis is instead 
based on a benchmark or baseline scenario which allows an assessment of whether the MDGs are likely to be 
achieved assuming unchanged policies (BAU) and taking into account non-linearities in the progress towards 
the outcomes for education, health, and water and sanitation.
Considerable differences across countries are evident. The poverty-reduction target is within reach 
for LAC as a whole, essentially because the baseline scenario for the region reflects continued good economic 
performance and policies in Mexico and Brazil; but existing growth performance and policies would not 
suffice to meet this goal for 11 out of the 18 countries. The goals for safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
are more uniformly achievable with the continuance of existing efforts in most countries of the region. The 
region is also making good progress in improving access to education, but—as highlighted in the present 
study—keeping all children in primary school until timely graduation remains a big challenge in nearly all 
of the countries of the region. Most countries are relatively off track in terms of meeting the ambitious target 
of 100 per cent completion rate, with the exception of Cuba, and, possibly, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico. 
All countries have made significant progress in reducing child mortality, but efforts will need to be stepped 
up in most countries in order to reduce early childhood deaths by two thirds by 2015. Only Chile and Cuba 
appear to be on track for this goal. Estimates of maternal mortality are subject to measurement errors, but 
the available evidence for the region suggests very little progress and, again, only Chile and Cuba seem to be 
on track for the target.32  DESA Working Paper No. 68
The analyses conducted in the country studies assume that additional resources are spent effec-
tively on improving the availability and quality of education services, health care delivery systems and basic 
sanitation and water provisioning. Precisely what this entails for sector-level policies at the country level 
varies (depending on initial conditions), but it would typically imply a focus on improving school inputs 
and enhancing teacher quality, as well as providing increased access to health services and enhanced coverage 
of vaccination programmes and basic sanitation. The studies also find that improving general infrastructure 
(including roads and energy supply) would improve the accessibility of health and education services and 
hence help support the achievement of the goals indirectly. However, meeting the MDGs is clearly not only 
a matter of expanding social spending in these directions. The country studies show strong effects from im-
proved socio-economic conditions at the household level, as better education helps improve health outcomes 
and vice versa, and improved income situations of households generally also contribute to enhancing access 
to health and education. The latter implies that reducing income poverty should also help achieve the other 
MDGs.
MDG 1 requires stronger employment growth and less income inequality
In most countries, additional policies will be required to meet the target for MDG 1. The present analysis 
does not consider specific interventions to reduce income poverty, but rather assumes poverty outcomes to 
result from the employment and income effects generated throughout the economy under the BAU and 
MDG strategy scenarios. It appears that the MDG strategy, through increased public spending on educa-
tion and health services, and on water and sanitation, does not induce sufficiently strong employment and 
income-distribution effects to make adequate progress towards the required level of poverty reduction in 
more than half of the countries of the region. Moderate-to-high average GDP growth under both the BAU 
and MDG scenarios only leads to modest employment growth effects. Only in a few countries, such as Bra-
zil, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua would the MDG strategy lead to significantly stronger aggregate 
demand growth and a larger decrease in poverty levels than under the BAU scenario. In the case of Hondu-
ras, this additional growth effect would enable the country to reach the target of halving extreme poverty by 
2015. Brazil and Guatemala would already reach it under the BAU scenario, whereas the additional output 
and employment growth would not be sufficient for Nicaragua to achieve MDG 1.
High income inequality remains an obstacle to the trickling down of stronger aggregate growth to 
the poor in the LAC countries. As the country studies show, and as expected, the MDG strategy generally 
reduces the supply of unskilled workers as boys and girls at primary-school age enrol in the education sys-
tem. It further raises the relative demand for skilled workers, owing to the expansion of skill-intensive social 
services. In some cases, the net effect is a shift in real wages in favour of unskilled workers, but where the 
increase in the demand for skilled workers is relatively strong, the reverse distributional shift may take place. 
Overall, the impact on income inequality at the household level is rather weak, at least over the time period 
under consideration.
Consequently, without additional policy interventions, most of the poverty-reduction effects of the 
MDG strategy depend on the aggregate effects on employment and mean incomes. However, macroeconomic 
trade-offs, such as the compression of private consumption and investment or slower export growth, weaken 
the aggregate demand effects of the growth in MDG-related public spending. Hence, as discussed further 
below, careful management of the financing of the MDG strategy is required. Some of the poverty-reduction 
gains may be felt more at a later date as improved education and health of the working population produce 
greater externalities in the form of total factor productivity growth. Arguably, however, most of these effects 
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To sum up, in order to make more progress towards a timely achievement of MDG 1, most coun-
tries would require complementary policies to strengthen employment growth and income opportunities for 
the poor.
MDG strategies will require sustained increases in social spending
The costs in terms of required additional spending on MDG-related services range from about 1 to 6 per 
cent of GDP per year, except for Cuba and Chile, which should be able to achieve the goals under BAU 
policies. For most countries, however, the additional cost would be less than 3 per cent of GDP, which seems 
moderate in macroeconomic terms, although it would imply substantial increases (in some cases a doubling) 
from base-year levels. For the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay, 
the estimated additional cost would be higher than 3 per cent of GDP per annum. For nearly all countries, 
synergies between greater needs satisfaction in terms of primary education, child and maternal health, and 
water and sanitation entail cost savings when striving to achieve all goals simultaneously. Such notional sav-
ings could range from 0.1 to about 1 per cent of GDP per annum compared to the (higher) estimated cost 
under a phased strategy for achieving the MDGs separately or under a purely sectoral approach to assessing 
MDG costs. The country analyses also suggest that the required MDG-related spending tends to increase 
as the targets approach achievement. This might imply that increased levels of social spending need to be 
sustained not only up to 2015 but also beyond that milestone, in order to avoid slippage from the achieved 
levels of human development.
Tax and spend
The financing of the additional social spending may involve important macroeconomic trade-offs and influ-
ence the MDG cost estimates. The country studies suggest that foreign financing (either through more bor-
rowing or grants) would generally be cheaper in terms of the required additional public spending. However, 
foreign financing would generate other important trade-offs as it would engender significantly stronger RER 
appreciation and deceleration of export growth than under the scenarios of domestic resource mobilization. 
Furthermore, a financing strategy based solely on foreign borrowing would lift public debt to unsustain-
able levels in virtually all country cases. The appreciation pressure on the RER could be manageable to the 
extent that countries have the necessary policy space to keep their exchange rates competitive, but in many 
cases this space may be limited in circumstances of rapidly increasing foreign debt and could cause currency 
mismatches in public finances and the financial sector (for a discussion, see, e.g., Ocampo and Vos, 2006). 
Financing the strategy through foreign aid is not a realistic alternative for most countries, except for Bolivia, 
Honduras and Nicaragua; in the case of Honduras, however, foreign aid financing appears to generate rather 
strong Dutch disease effects, raising the need for foreign financing well beyond the increased fiscal needs; in 
Nicaragua, aid dependency is already quite high and increasing it further may therefore not be desirable.
These limitations to foreign financing put more weight on the role of domestic resource mobili-
zation. Domestic government borrowing, however, appears to generate a relatively strong crowding-out 
of private spending and would also lift public debt to unsustainable levels in most country cases. The 
crowding-out effect is essentially “model driven”, of course, but is likely a realistic approximation of insuf-
ficiently developed domestic bond markets in the countries of the region, making it difficult and costly for 
Governments to borrow from the private sector. Consequently, increased taxation is left as the core option 
for countries to consider. Effective tax burdens in LAC are low by any standard, suggesting ample scope for 
a tax-financed MDG strategy. This should probably be a priority in all countries, but a number of associated 
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First, tax financing generally raises the required additional social spending as it compresses private 
spending, including that on MDG-related services, and hence the Government would have to step in more 
forcefully. Governments could try to avoid this by ensuring that tax increases are mainly paid for by higher 
income groups. This may not be easy given the existing scope for tax evasion, but the objective of keeping 
the MDG strategy affordable would make closing such loopholes even more imperative.
Second, tax reforms take time to become effective and the scope for significantly raising government 
revenue may be limited. In the present analysis, we suggest that over the period remaining between now 
and 2015, it might be possible to increase tax revenue at best by 2.5 percentage points of GDP—relative to 
the base year of the analysis—with a successful and swiftly implemented tax reform. If such a move on tax 
reform can be made politically acceptable, then tax financing would seem a feasible option for financing the 
MDG strategy in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru. For other countries, 
this would likely remain a tall order, and those countries may have to employ mixed financing strategies after 
weighing the different trade-offs.
Most likely, a combination of financing sources will have to be considered in all cases. Measured 
foreign borrowing could be considered in an initial period during which a tax reform is to be implemented. 
Furthermore, all countries should assess the scope for creating more fiscal space by enhancing the efficiency 
of public spending and tax collection. The model analyses assume that the additional fiscal allocations for 
achieving the MDGs are targeted towards effective interventions. Even so, there may be scope for improv-
ing efficiency where existing resources for education, health, and water and sanitation are underutilized, as 
discussed in section 2. The country models do not assess the scope for such efficiency gains, as this would re-
quire further in-depth sector analysis in each of the countries, nor do they gauge efficiency in tax collection; 
however, it is generally assumed that there is ample space for improvement on this front in most countries of 
the region.
Bearing these caveats in mind, achieving the MDGs is within reach and clearly affordable for all 
LAC countries in the study. It is clearly more than a matter of priority-setting or finding the additional re-
sources, however; it also entails carefully managing and integrating macroeconomic and social-sector policies. 
It is also clear that enhanced spending on MDG-related services and the progress towards the education, 
health, and water and sanitation goals do not guarantee strong income redistribution and poverty reduction 
results in the short-to-medium run. Most countries will have to make additional efforts in this direction. 
What is more, for most countries it appears that the improved educational performance in recent decades 
is already accelerating the supply of skilled workers, but their economies have not sufficiently adjusted to 
accommodate the changing composition of the labour force and they are therefore not reaping the potential 
benefits in terms of productivity improvements. This shows that further economic reforms are needed to 
adjust to higher levels of human development for the population of the region. It also suggests that while 
upholding the promise of achieving the MDGs, policymakers also need to stretch their horizons well beyond 
these goals.Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  35
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Appendix:
Microsimulation methodology
The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used for generating the BAU and MDG scenarios 
(MAMS) provides only relatively aggregate outcomes for employment and wages by labour category. Simi-
larly, the model typically only distinguishes between a few groups of households for assessing the impact of 
alternative policy scenarios on per capita household consumption and income. CGE simulations therefore 
only allow us to draw conclusions about the differences in impact for these aggregate labour and household 
groups—thus ignoring income distribution changes within those groups. Hence, we revert to a microsimula-
tion methodology to take account of the full income distribution. In line with recent practice of methodolo-
gies studying the economy-wide effects of economic policies, we adopt a top-down approach. That is to say, 
we take the CGE simulation results and apply them to the full distribution as given by a micro data set (i.e., 
the household survey) and assume there are no further feedback effects.
The top-down causal chain works from policy changes or exogenous shocks through the operation 
of factor and product markets yielding prices, wages and employment, and finally to household income and 
expenditure. A crucial part of analysing and modelling distributional outcomes at the household level is the 
specification of the various sources of income at that level and of how those sources are linked to the opera-
tion of factor and product markets.
For current purposes, we focus on the labour market as the main transmission channel of the mod-
elled impact of the simulated scenarios on poverty and income distribution. To go from the counterfactual 
labour-market effects simulated with the CGE model to poverty and income distribution at the household 
level, we need to deal with two methodological issues. First, how can both between- and within-group effects 
be incorporated into the distribution analysis? That is to say, how can we account for the full distribution 
and thus for the heterogeneity of the population within households when assessing the poverty and in-
equality effects? Second, people may change position in the labour market (and hence also affect household 
income) due to external shocks, trade reforms, or other policy changes such as the MDG strategies exam-
ined in this study. Workers may shift from one sector to another, change occupation or lose their jobs. The 
methodological issue is to find a procedure that can account for such labour-market shifts and identify which 
individuals are most likely to shift position in order to be able to simulate a new, counterfactual income 
distribution.
Various microsimulation methodologies have been proposed in the literature to deal with these 
problems.a1We note two types that attempt to answer the type of questions raised in this study. The first in-
volves the estimation of a microeconomic, partial-equilibrium household income generation model through 
a system of equations that determine occupational choice, returns to labour and human capital, consumer 
prices and other household (individual) income components (see, for instance, Bourguignon, Fournier and 
Gurgand, 2001; Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig, 2001). Combining this methodology in “top-down” 
fashion with a CGE model has been probed by Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2002) for the case of 
Indonesia.
1a  See Bourguignon, Pereira da Silva and Stern (2002) for an overview of related methods. It should be noted that the 
approach is relatively new in its application to the developing country context, but that combinations of macro or 
CGE policy models and microsimulations, for instance to assess distributional effects of tax reforms, are quite common 
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A second microsimulation approach of less modelling intensity assumes that occupational shifts 
may be proxied by a random selection procedure within a segmented labour-market structure. This proce-
dure allows the imposition of counterfactual changes in key labour-market parameters (participation rate, 
unemployment, employment composition by sector, wage structure, and so on) on a given distribution 
derived from household survey data, and the estimation of the impact of each change on poverty and income 
distribution at the household level. This is the approach used here, based on the methodology developed in 
Ganuza, Paes de Barros and Vos (2002) and more widely applied in Vos and others (2006). The basic intu-
ition behind this approach is as follows.
Total per capita household income is defined as:
       ( 1 )
where nh is the size of household h, yphi the labour income of member i of household h, and yqh the sum of all 
non-labour incomes of the household, defined as:
        ( 2 )
In equation (2), yqphi equals individual non-labour income of member i of household h and yqth 
equals other household incomes. In the simulations, yphi is altered for some individuals i of household h as a 
result of changes in the labour-market parameters. Ganuza, Paes de Barros and Vos (2002) define the labour-
market structure in terms of rates of economic participation Pj and unemployment Uj among different 
groups j of the population at working age (defined according to sex and skill), the structure of employment 
(defined according to sector of activity S and occupational category O) and remuneration W1, as well as over-
all level of remuneration W2. The skill composition of the employed population is represented by variable M. 
The labour-market structure can be written as π = π(P,U,S,O,W1,W2,M). In the application of the method-
ology in the country studies referred to in the present paper, the labour-market structure was defined in a 
somewhat more limited fashion as π = π(U,S,W1,W2,M), as changes in participation rates P are not  explicitly 
modelled in MAMS and the labour factor was not classified by occupational group O.  
For all types of individuals, the unemployment rates determine part of the labour-market structure. 
The latter is further determined by the structure of employment. The employed workforce is classified ac-
cording to segment k, defined on the basis of sector of activity. For the three skill groups (unskilled, semi-
skilled and skilled workers) within segments k in the labour market, the average remuneration is calculated 
and these averages are expressed as a ratio of the overall average. The effect of altering each of the parameters 
of the labour-market structure on poverty and inequality can then be analysed using the accounting identi-
ties of equations (1) and (2). The impact of changes in the labour market can be analysed both separately 
and sequentially.
The Ganuza-Paes de Barros-Vos approach introduces a number of important assumptions about 
the labour market. First, as indicated, for lack of a full model of the labour market, a randomized process is 
applied to simulate the effects of changes in the labour-market structure. That is to say, random numbers are 
used to determine which persons at working age change their labour force status; who will change occupa-
tional category; which employed persons obtain a different level of education; and how new mean labour 40  DESA Working Paper No. 68
incomes are assigned to individuals in the sample.b2Hence, the assumption is that, on average, the effect of 
the random changes correctly reflects the impact of the actual changes in the labour market. Because of the 
introduction of a process of random assignation, the microsimulations are repeated a large number of times 
in Monte Carlo fashion.c3This allows constructing 95 per cent confidence intervals for the indices of inequal-
ity and poverty, except in the case of the simulations of the effect of change in the structure and level of 
remuneration, which do not involve random numbers. In each simulation, a number of poverty and inequal-
ity measures are calculated. 
The approach outlined above is fairly straightforward when applied with static CGE models; in 
other words, when generating just one change from a given base year which is also (close to) the base year of 
a household survey. The present analysis, however, covers a simulation period that runs from the country-
specific base year to 2015, the point at which the MDGs are expected to have been achieved. Therefore, the 
application of the microsimulation method needs to be situated in a dynamic setting.
For the application of the methodology in a dynamic setting, we follow the procedure spelled out 
in Sánchez (2004) and Sánchez and Vos (2005 and 2006). As indicated in these studies, a number of ad-
ditional, restrictive assumptions are required, as observed survey data may only be available for the base year 
and perhaps a few years beyond that, but not for the entire projected forward period. In the microsimula-
tions beyond the base year of the household survey data and for lack of additional modelling of demographic 
shifts and labour participation, it is assumed that no changes in the population structure (such as migration 
or population ageing) take place during the simulation period. This is an obvious limitation of the method-
ology, but justifiable to the extent that the CGE model does not consider such demographic changes either. 
2b  Mean incomes per decile are calculated in the simulations. These means are subsequently assigned to newly employed 
or to already-employed persons who changed sector of employment, occupational category or moved from one 
educational group to another. In principle, to assess the impact of changes in the labour-market structure, one would 
have to calibrate the database prior to simulating the effect of said changes — that is to say, to replace the original labour 
incomes by mean incomes per decile. A test showed that neither the direction of change nor the magnitude of the effect 
altered when using the original values of the labour incomes instead of calibrated values. 
3c  Experiments with the methodology for several household survey data sets show that about 30 iterations are sufficient. 
Further iterations do not alter the results.Latin America and the Caribbean’s Challenge to Reach the MDGs  41
Statistical Annex
Figure A.1  Percentage level of achievement for MDG 1 by 2002/2003 and under 
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Source: Authors’ construction, based on country studies referred to in the present paper. 
a/ Based on the evolution of the percentage of the population living on less than a dollar a day from 1990 
(or nearest available year) to about the mid-point of the time span for achieving the MDGs, and further to 
2015 under the BAU scenario. The bar for LAC presents the regional average, weighted by each country’s 
total population.   
Figure A.2  Percentage level of achievement for MDG 2 by 2002/2003 and under 




















-50 0 50 100
From 1990 to around mid-point From around mid-point to 2015 in BAU scenario
Target
 
Source: Authors’ construction, based on country studies referred to in the present paper. 
a/ Based on the evolution of the on-time primary school completion rate from 1990 (or nearest available 
year) to about the mid-point of the time span for achieving the MDGs, and further to 2015 under the BAU 
scenario. See notes to table 2 for additional methodological details. 42  DESA Working Paper No. 68
Figure A.3   Percentage level of achievement for MDG 4 by 2002/2003 and under 









































From 1990 to around mid-point From around mid-point to 2015 in BAU scenario
Target
 
Source: Authors’ construction, based on country studies referred to in the present paper. 
a/ Based on the evolution of the under-five mortality rate from 1990 (or nearest available year) to about the 
mid-point of the time span for achieving the MDGs, and further to 2015 under the BAU scenario. The bar 
for LAC presents the regional average, weighted by each country’s population under five. See notes to 
table 2 for additional methodological details. 
Figure A.4  Percentage level of achievement for MDG 5 by 2002/2003 and under 






























-100 -50 0 50 100 1 50
From 1990 to around mid-point From around mid-point to 2015 in BAU scenario
Target
 
Source: Authors’ construction, based on country studies referred to in the present paper. 
a/ Based on the evolution of the maternal mortality rate from 1990 (or nearest available year) to about the 
mid-point of the time span for achieving the MDGs, and further to 2015 under the BAU scenario. The bar 
for LAC presents the regional average of these 13 countries, weighted by each country’s total number of 
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